I write this editorial to expose and criticize what I believe to be serious errors of understanding and reasoning in the recent decisions of two US Federal Appeals Courts to strike down sections of Washington and New York state laws prohibiting physicians from aiding terminally ill but competent patients to end their lives. These decisions and the reasoning used to defend them have sent shock waves through the bedrock of thought and basic distinctions that have, for decades, governed medical decisions and acts on behalf of the dying. Although the strictly legal reasoning used in the explanation of these decisions may be particular to the Constitution and jurisprudence of the United States, the decisions themselves essentially rest upon a rejection of the idea that discontinuing life-prolonging treatment, as well as the proportionate u~e of medications to relieve pain and symptom diStress, are clinically, ethically, and legally different from the administration of death and the assisting of sick people to end their lives.
The Recent Decisions
On March 6, 1996, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which covers the states of Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington, decided that the Washing-t~n statute rendering it unlawful for one person to aid another to attempt suicide should no longer prohibit physicians from prescribing life-ending medication for use by terminally ill competent adults who wish to hasten their own deaths (1). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which covers the states of Connecticut, New York, and Vermont, reached a similar decision on April 2, 1996, when it declared that two statutes of New York State are invalid to the extent that they prohibit physicians from complying with the requests of terminally ill, mentally competent patients for help in hastening death. In the states of New York and Washington, then, physicians who are willing to do so may now prescribe drugs to be self-administered by mentally competent patients who seek to end their lives during the final stages of a terminal illness (2).
Politically Correct Words?
Both Appeals Courts, as well as media articles commenting on these decisions, use the term "physician-assisted suicide" to name the practice of physicians' prescribing lethal drugs for selfadministration by the terminally ill. However, the Court pronouncing on the Washington State statute simultaneously questions the correctness of calling a patient's self-administration of such drugs "suicide" and of calling a physician's prescribing of such drugs "assisted suicide". Despite the wide use of the term "physician-assisted suicide", the judges state that they "are doubtful that deaths resulting from patients taking medication prescribed by their doctors should be classified as 'suicide'" (3). This same court also emphatically distinguishes this practice from euthanasia.
Why does the Court prefer the terms "determining the time and manner of one's death" or "hastening one's death" to the term suicide? Because this Court places the taking of lethal drugs by a terminally ill patient in the same category as withholding or withdrawing life-prolonging treatments, despite the fact that no one thinking and writing seriously on this subject over the last twenty years has ever proposed that a patient's refusal of such treatment is suicide.
Why, then, is a physician's prescription of lethal drugs for self-administration by a terminally ill person not to be called "assisted euthanasia"? Because the Court has chosen to define euthanasia "as the act or practice of painlessly putting to death persons suffering from incurable and distressing disease, as an act of mercy, but not at the person's request" (4) . Euthanasia for this Court means administering death to a terminally ill person without that person's consent or request.
The Court seems to be playing a very politically correct game. It is approving a practice that is neither suicide nor assisted suicide, nor is it euthanasia. Not being euthanasia, the practice now approved cannot be associated. with all those messy debates about what's going on in the Netherlands, nor with the very divisive debates about euthanasia in North America. Not being suicide, the practice need not be associated with acts that other people are desperately trying to hinder with suicide prevention programs all over the world. The practice of physician-prescription of lethal drugs for self-administration by terminally ill patients is now to be comfortably and safely ensconced in the same category as discontinuance of life-prolonging treatment and the use of medications to relieve pain and symptoms, medical acts that are widely accepted, approved, and even urged as necessary in many circumstances. It is with this equation that the judges err most seriously.
There's No Difference? Really?
The Appeals Court deciding on the New York State statutes declared: "Physicians do not fulfill the role of 'killer' by prescribing drugs to hasten death any more than they do by disconnecting life-support systems" (5) . This Court, rightly rejecting the action-inaction distinction as irrelevant, sees no other basis for a difference between allowing nature to take its course, even in the most severe situations, and intentionally using an artificial death-producing device (6) . The Court deliberating on the Washington State statute holds the same view in declaring that "a distinction on the basis of whether the patient's death results from an underlying disease no longer has any legitimacy" (7) .
The distinction between action and inaction, between mission and commission, really is a red herring, a distraction, and is not the basis for the clinical and ethical difference between (a) administering death to a terminally ill patient (voluntary or non-voluntary euthanasia) or helping such persons to administer death to themselves (assisted euthanasia) and (b) allowing terminally ill patients to die. The real difference between these two sets of acts rests with the power and authority physicians should be allowed to exercise over the bodies and lives of sick and dying people. Lifeprolonging treatments and technologies do not carry their own in-built ethical or legal imperatives and physicians' authority to submit gravely ill and dying patients to such treatments is limited by two basic principles: the doctor's mandate to do no harm to the sick and the right of the sick and the dying to receive respect for their bodily and personal integrity.
The consensus reached over the last twenty years about the justifiability of withholding or discontinuing life-prolonging treatments in a range of clinical circumstances rests upon this recognition of the clinical and ethical limits to a doctor's mandate to intervene into the bodies of the sick and the dying. That consensus also rests upon the real distinction between two kinds of acts that are clinically and ethically different: (a) acts of withholding or discontinuing treatments that can reverse a disease process leading to death (for example, withholding surgery for infants afflicted with an intestinal blockage) and (b) acts of withholding or discontinuing treatments that cannot reverse or stabilize a disease process leading to death, but can only prolong the dying process.
The judges have erred in failing to recognize these distinctions. That error is what allows them to collapse physician-assisted suicide (what this editorial names as physician-assisted euthanasia) into the totally different ethical category of withholding or discontinuing treatments that only prolong the dying process.
Killing the Pain Equals Killing the Patient?
The Court deciding on the Washington State statute equates the use of analgesics to relieve pain with the administration of death. The judges state: "Equally important, today, doctors are generally permitted to administer death-inducing medication, as long as they can point to a concomitant pain-relieving purpose." (8) Here the judges err in their understanding of the methods of palliative medicine. They are not alone. It is in part because of a failure to grasp the essential distinction between euthanasia and the palliative control of pain and symptoms that some doctors, fearful of legal liability for hastening death, have gone just so far, and not far enough, in their use of medications to give patients the relief for which they so often have to beg. Those who know little about palliative medicine may fail to appreciate the relative risks of using opioids for pain control. Tolerance to respiratory depression readily occurs in patients receiving chronic opioid therapy. In these patients, increasing opioid use to ensure pain relief, and sometimes using sedation in combination with other drugs, is rarely the cause of a patient's death. A dying patient receiving frequent medication for pain and symptom control will eventually die after receiving a dosage of medication. After all, these people are dying. It is a fallacy to conclude that the medication and not the last surge of the underlying disease caused the patient's death.
It is foolish to deny patients relief from pain because of fears that effective relief of pain will shorten life. It is equally foolish to suggest, as the judges have, that doctors are regularly administering death when they relieve the pain of the dying.
Don't Worry! We'll Manage the Slope!
The judges deliberating on the Washington State statute are aware, they say, that the day of the family doctor who knew the frailties and strengths of each family member is long gone. They also realize that the intense personal interest doctors used to take in their patients' welfare and activities is also long gone. Nevertheless, we are told we shouldn't worry that allowing doctors to prescribe lethal medications for dying patients will lead to abuse, because doctors, the judges remind us, are highly-regulated professionals. It should not be too difficult, the jUdges emphasize, to establish rules and procedures to prevent neglect, exertion of pressure on people, and abuse (9) .
There is also, of course the troublesome matter of people feeling pressured to terminate their lives because they feel they are a burden on their families and loved ones, particularly in tough economic times, such as the times in which we live. However, the judges are, so they say themselves, "reluctant to say that, in a society in which costs of protracted health care can be so exorbitant, it is improper for competent, terminally ill adults to take the economic welfare of their families and loved ones into consideration." (10) I believe it is in their assessment of society's capacity to prevent abuse against those who are weak, vulnerable, and not strongly competent that the judges err most grievously in striking down laws that prohibit physicians from prescribing death. Will the principle of autonomy, so vaunted by the judges in these decisions, hold its own for people who are not autonomous? Will the principle of autonomy hold its own against those who, unbridled now by law, believe that the value of human lives should be measured by their utility?
